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Abstract
This paper examines a two-period duopoly where consumers are locked-
in by switching costs that they face in the second period. The paper’s
main focus is on the question of how the consumer lock-in affects the
firms’ choice of product durability. We show that firms may face a
prisoners’ dilemma situation in that they simultaneously choose non-
durable products although they would have higher profits by produc-
ing durables. From a social welfare perspective, firms may even choose
an inefficiently high level of product durability.
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1 Introduction
The relation between market structure and product durability has been on
the economists’ research agenda for a long time. The existing literature,
however, does not take into account the impact of consumer lock-in on firms’
durability choice. In many markets, consumers face costs of switching from
a product to one of its substitutes. For example, users of hardware products
such as computers, hand-held organizers or digital-music players learn how
to use their brand and invest in appropriate software. These costs may be
sunk when changing the brand.1 Examples show that product durability is
an important issue for hardware firms. Shorter warranty periods indicate
that hardware firms tend to reduce the lifetime of their products. For exam-
ple, in 2001, Dell Computer reduced warranty periods from three years to
one. Apple Computer’s iPod digital audio player comes with only a 90-day
warranty and Sony requires purchasers to register to get a full year of support
on a Clie organizer - otherwise, they, too, get 90 days of warranty.2
These examples raise the question of why firms would want to reduce dura-
bility. We will show in a two-period duopoly framework that firms may face a
prisoners’ dilemma situation in that they simultaneously choose non-durable
products in the initial stage although they would be better off by produc-
ing durables. The explanation is as follows: Consumer lock-in gives firms
monopoly power over their market segments in the second period. Since
second-period profits increase with first-period market shares, firms com-
pete more aggressively in the first period. In our model, the first-period
competition more than dissipates firms’ extra monopolistic returns of the
second period so that consumer lock-in reduces firms’ overall profits. By
jointly choosing durable products (i.e. products that last for two periods),
firms could overcome the negative competition effect of consumer lock-in
and would realize the same overall profits as in the case without consumer
lock-in. However, in some cases, the joint choice of durable products cannot
be implemented in equilibrium. If the marginal costs of producing durables
are relatively large compared to the marginal costs of non-durable products,
each firm has the incentive to unilaterally deviate (i.e. to choose non-durable
1See Klemperer (1995) for further categories of switching costs.
2Source: http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/public/wsj-planned-obsolescence.html
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products). Whenever firms choose the same level of durability, costs can be
completely shifted to consumers. However, if firms choose different levels of
durability, overall profits depend on marginal costs. Thus, each firm could
take advantage of the large difference in costs by deviating.
Furthermore, the examples of reduced warranty periods raise the question
of market efficiency. A standard result of the existing literature on product
durability is that firms choose excessive obsolescence, i.e. products have an
inefficiently low lifetime.3 We will show that the equilibrium where both
firms choose non-durable products is harmful to firms but efficient from a
social welfare perspective. In this sense, the equilibrium with non-durable
products cannot be characterized as “excessive obsolescence”. Moreover, we
will challenge the perspective of “excessive obsolescence” by showing that
both firms may even choose an inefficiently high level of durability if differ-
ences in marginal costs (with respect to durability) are low. In this situation,
firms jointly choose durable products in equilibrium. Since firms do not in-
ternalize costs that they can shift to consumers, they provide an excessive
level of durability.
The result that consumer lock-in may lead to excessive durability is a novel
contribution to the literature on product durability. In a fundamentally dif-
ferent approach, Fishman et al. (1993) show that a competitive market may
generate too much durability in equilibrium. They consider an economy with
overlapping generations of consumers and a large number of firms. In each
period, a randomly chosen firm has the opportunity to develop a new tech-
nology but innovation is costly. In return for the innovation, the innovator
firm would gain a temporary monopoly position. The potential innovator’s
incentive to develop a new technology is reduced when the old consumer gen-
eration holds durable products, i.e. the temporary monopoly position would
be less attractive. Eventually, due to economies of scale in the production
of durability, firms may repeatedly produce durables, which in turn impede
firms’ incentives to innovate. For certain development costs, innovation may
be desirable from a social welfare perspective, whereas the scale economy
associated with durability would lead to technological stagnation.
3See, for example, Waldman (1993), Choi (1994) and Grout and Park (2005) for work
on the issue of “excessive obsolescence”.
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Moreover, our paper is related to a second strand of literature dealing with
switching costs and consumer lock-in. Klemperer (1987) considers a two-
period duopoly model with intertemporally changing consumer preferences.
In the first period, rational consumers anticipate that they will be partially
locked in to their first-period supplier due to switching costs. When mak-
ing their first-period purchase decisions, consumers predict the second-period
prices which depend on the first-period market shares. Rational consumers
anticipate that a first-period price cut that increases the firm’s first-period
market share would result in a higher second-period price. Thus, rational
expectations with respect to the second-period prices make consumers first-
period demand less elastic than it would be in an identical market without
switching cost. Eventually, switching costs may either increase or reduce
firms’ overall profits. Our model follows Klemperer (1987) in considering a
spatial location duopoly model of product differentiation. The main differ-
ences between our model and Klemperer’s are: (i) We extend the model by
assuming that products may either last for one or for two periods so that
we can analyze the firms’ durability choice. (ii) For the sake of tractability,
we confine our analysis to the case where all second-period consumers were
in the first-period market and have unchanged preferences.4 In our model,
switching costs clearly reduce the firms’ overall profits. By jointly choosing
durable products, firms may mitigate the effects of switching costs. Alterna-
tively, as shown by Farrell and Gallini (1988), firms may license their product
to second-source suppliers thereby committing themselves to lower prices in
the future. In return, their products become more attractive at the present
time. Farrell and Shapiro (1989) consider the case where firms may write
long-term contracts to reduce their market power over locked-in consumers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section
sets up the model structure. In Section 3, we analyze the second-period
equilibrium that depends on the first-period market shares. Section 4 deals
with first-period pricing depending on the initially chosen levels of product
durability. In Section 5, we endogenize the firms’ durability choice and we
discuss its welfare implications. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. The
proofs of formal results are relegated to an appendix.
4Klemperer (1987) briefly discusses the second-period equilibrium for this case.
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2 The Model Setup
We consider a two-period market where two firms offer differentiated prod-
ucts. In the initial stage, both firms i = A,B simultaneously choose the level
of product durability di ∈ {1, 2}. A non-durable good (di = 1) lasts for one
period and a durable good (di = 2) lasts for two periods. Firms have unit
costs increasing with the level of durability but no fixed costs. Let cII > cI ,
where cI stands for the unit costs of d
i = 1 and cII denotes the unit costs
of di = 2. In addition, we assume that each firm can produce at costs cI a
product with one-period durability in the second (and last) period.
In the first period, firms A and B simultaneously set prices pA1 and p
B
1 to
maximize their total discounted profits. A spatial location model of hori-
zontal product differentiation is used to describe preferences: Consumers are
uniformly arrayed along the interval [0, L] and firm A and B located at 0
and L, respectively. Thus a consumer at z ∈ [0, L] incurs a transport cost z
of using product A or (L− z) of using B’s product. Whereas consumers face
different transport costs, they have identical reservation prices r. Assume
that each consumer will only buy from one firm in any period and that it is
not possible to store products between periods.
In the second period consumers have the same tastes for the underlying
product characteristics as in the first period, i.e. unchanged transport costs.
If consumers have purchased a non-durable product in the first period, they
have to repeat purchase in the second period. A crucial assumption is that
consumers face switching costs s of buying a product that they have not
previously bought.5
For simplicity, we make the following three assumptions with respect to the
parameters. In particular, these assumptions confine the model to the case
5As Klemperer (1987) or Padilla (1992), we do not explicitly model start-up costs
which consumers incur in the first period. Generally, start-up costs are similar to the
new investment (switching cost) that a brand switcher must make. Since these costs
are unavoidable for consumers, they would not alter our analysis, as long as consumers’
participation constraints are fulfilled. Suppose that L = cI = δ = 1, r = 4, s = 3 and
1 < cII < 2 holds. For this example, all participation constraints are fulfilled, even if
consumers must pay a start-up costs s = 3, and the same results as in section 5 can be
derived.
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where all consumers buy in the first and in the second period (if there is a need
to repeat purchase). Detailed explanations are postponed to Sections 3 and
4. In Section 5, we consider a numerical example that satisfies Assumptions
1-3.
Assumption 1 2L+ cI ≤ r ≤ cI + s
Assumption 1 defines sufficient conditions for a second-period Nash equilib-
rium. As Section 3 will explain in detail, the left-hand side of this assumption
guarantees that each firm sells to all its previous consumers in the second pe-
riod. The right-hand side states that switching costs must be sufficiently large
to give firms monopoly power over their locked-in consumers. As Proposition
2 will show, Assumption 1 is also sufficient to guarantee for the symmetric
case with dA = dB = 1 that all consumers buy in the first period.
Assumption 2 cII ≤ cˆII = (1 + δ)(2r − 3L)/2
As we will show in Propositions 3 and 4, Assumption 2 ensures for the sym-
metric case with dA = dB = 2 and for the asymmetric case (di = 1 and
dj =i = 2) that the first-period market is covered.
Assumption 3 α < cII < β, where
α := (1 + δ)cI − L(3 + 2δ),
β := (1 + δ)(3L+ cI).
In the asymmetric case (di = 1 and dj =i = 2), large differences in costs cI and
cII may result in the monopolization of the first-period market. Assumption
3 guarantees that both firms sell in the first period, i.e. σi∗ ∈ (0, 1). For
simplicity, we confine our analysis to this case.
The time structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1: First firms
simultaneously choose durability (dA, dB). In the subsequent stage firms
simultaneously set first-period prices (pA1 , p
B
1 ) where each firm observes the
durability choice of the competitor. Then, consumers make their first-period
purchase decision for given prices (pA1 , p
B
1 ). Finally, firms simultaneously
set second-period prices (pA2 , p
B
2 ). If consumers have bought a non-durable
product in the first period, they have to repeat purchase in the second period.
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Firms’ choice of
durability (dA, dB)
Firms set first-period
prices (pA1 , p
B
1 )
Consumers’ first-period
purchase decision
Firms set second-period
prices (pA2 , p
B
2 )
Consumers’ second-period
purchase decision
Figure 1: The Sequence of Events
3 The Second Period
In this section, we derive the firms’ profit-maximizing second-period prices
as functions of the first-period market shares σi. For simplicity, we assume
that all consumers have bought in the first period. The second-period prices
depend on the firms’ durability choice in the initial stage. Suppose that firm
i has chosen durability di = 1 in the initial stage. Then, consumers who have
previously bought product i have to repeat purchase in the second period.
Proposition 1 specifies the equilibrium strategies. Recall that Assumption 1
defines sufficient conditions for a second-period Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Suppose that all consumers have bought in the first period.
The profit-maximizing prices of firm i = A,B depend on the firm’s initially
chosen level of durability di and on its first-period market share σi:
(i) If di = 1, firm i’s profit-maximizing second-period price is given by pi∗2 =
r− σiL and second-period profits are equal to Πi∗2 = (r− σiL− cI)σiL.
(ii) If di = 2, firm i can set any price pi∗2 ≥ cI and second-period profits are
equal to Πi∗2 = 0.
These price strategies constitute the second-period Nash equilibrium for any
market share 0 < σi < 1 if Assumption 1 holds.
Proof: see Appendix.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 refers to to the case of di = 1 and states that firm
i acts as a monopolist on its base of previous consumers. The most distant
first-period buyer of product i incurs transport costs σiL of using product i
again. Then, firm i may completely extract the second-period surplus of this
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most distant buyer by setting the second-period price equal to pi∗2 = r−σiL.
Alternatively, firm i could choose a higher price thereby abandoning some of
its locked-in consumers. The left-hand side of Assumption 1 (2L + cI ≤ r)
makes this strategy unprofitable. Thus, if consumers’ reservation price r is
large enough compared to L and to marginal costs cI , firm i sells to all its
previous consumers in the second period (Proof: see Appendix).
The right-hand side of Assumption 1 (r ≤ cI+s) states that switching costs
must be sufficiently large to give firm i monopoly power over its segment of
locked-in consumers. To see the intuition behind this assumption, consider
the most distant consumer of the B segment who incurs transport costs σBL
of using product B. If this consumer buys product B again, his surplus is
completely extracted by pB∗2 = r − σBL. He would prefer product A to B if
r − σAL − pA2 − s > 0. Thus, with prices pˆA2 < r − σAL − s, firm A could
attract previous buyers of product B. Notice that the condition r < cI + s is
sufficiently strict to ensure that the undercutting price pˆA2 = r− σAL− s− ǫ
is always below marginal costs cI , i.e. even if σ
A → 0 firm A would incur
a loss by intruding into the rival firm’s segment. Also, this implies for the
asymmetric case (di = 1 and dj =i = 2) that firm j could not compete for
second-period buyers who have previously bought product i. Therefore, firm
j could set any price pj∗2 ≥ cI without selling products in the second period,
as stated in part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 shows that second-period prices pi∗2 decrease with market
share because the surplus of the most distant consumer is reduced by larger
transport costs. However, σi has a positive effect on second-period profits,
i.e. ∂Πi∗2 /∂σ
i > 0. Thus the negative price effect is offset by the positive
effect on demand.
4 The First Period
The first-period prices depend on the durability levels firms have chosen in
the initial stage. In the following analysis, we distinguish three cases: The
symmetric case with low durability (dA = dB = 1), the symmetric case with
high durability (dA = dB = 2) and the asymmetric case where di = 1 and
dj =i = 2. The second-period profits, as stated in Proposition 1, can be used
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in the first-period maximization problem because they are defined for any
market share.
4.1 Symmetric Case with Low Durability
We first start with the symmetric case where both firms have chosen non-
durable products (dA = dB = 1) in the initial stage. Consider a first-period
consumer located at z. The consumer’s overall surplus from buying product
A is
r − z − pA1 + δ[r − z − (r − σAeL)]. (1)
In the first period, the consumer gets reservation utility r but he incurs trans-
port cost z of using product A. In addition, he must pay the first-period price
pA1 . The expression in the square brackets refers to the consumer’s second-
period surplus in the case he buys product A again where δ denotes the
discount factor.6 Again, the consumer gets r and incurs transport cost z.
Moreover, he anticipates the second-period price pA2 = r − σAeL which de-
pends on the expected first-period market share σAe of firm A. Analogously,
the consumer’s overall surplus from buying product B in both periods is
equal to
r − (L− z)− pB1 + δ[r − (L− z)− (r − σBeL)]. (2)
The marginal consumer is indifferent between buying product A and B, so
that
z =
L+ 2δσAeL− pA1 + pB1
2(1 + δ)
. (3)
As in Klemperer (1987), we set σAe = σA = z/L, so that expectations are
fulfilled. Then, firm A’s market share is equal to
σAe = σA =
L− pA1 + pB1
2L
. (4)
6As stated in Assumption 1, switching costs s are sufficiently large to ensure that each
firm has monopoly power over its segment of locked-in consumers. Thus, we can ignore
the case that the consumer switches to the competitor’s product in the second period.
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Firms’ (i = A,B) overall profits are given by
Πi = (pi1 − cI)σiL+ δ(r − σiL− cI)σiL. (5)
Both firms simultaneously set prices, thereby taking into account the
impact of first-period market shares on the second-period prices. Proposition
2 states the first-period equilibrium prices and overall profits.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where both firms have chosen dA = dB = 1
in the initial stage. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, which is sufficient to
ensure that all consumers buy in the first period. Then, the symmetric first-
period equilibrium prices are given by
p1(1, 1)
∗ = (L+ cI)(1 + δ)− δr
and overall profits are equal to
Π(1, 1)∗ =
L2(2 + δ)
4
.
Proof: see Appendix.
Under Assumption 1, first-period prices are lower than they would be
if there were no second period (i.e. δ = 0). This standard result of the
switching cost literature can be explained as follows: Since second-period
profits increase with market share, firms compete more aggressively in the
first period. Also, first-period prices decrease with r because high reservation
prices raise second-period profits, thereby making the competition for market
share more fierce.7 The reservation price r has no impact on overall profits.
Thus, the positive effect on second-period profits is completely compensated
by the negative effect on the first-period profits. Due to symmetry, firms can
completely shift the costs to consumers as long as cI is not too high compared
to r. As Proposition 2 states, Assumption 1 guarantees that all consumers
buy in the first period (Proof: see appendix).
7It may be worthwhile for firms to subsidize consumers in the first period’s competition
for market share which is the prerequisite for second-period profits.
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4.2 Symmetric Case with High Durability
We now analyze the symmetric case where both firms have chosen dA =
dB = 2 in the initial stage. Consider a first-period consumer located at z.
The consumer’s overall surplus from buying product A is
(1 + δ)(r − z)− pA1 . (6)
In both periods, the consumer gets reservation utility r minus transport costs
z of using product A. Since product A is durable, the consumer does not
need to repeat purchase in the second period. Analogously, the consumer’s
overall surplus from buying product B is equal to
(1 + δ)[r − (L− z)]− pB1 (7)
The marginal consumer is indifferent between buying product A and B, so
that
σA =
L(1 + δ)− pA1 + pB1
2L(1 + δ)
. (8)
Since firms (i = A,B) do not sell products in the second period, profits are
simply given by
Πi = (pi1 − cII)σiL. (9)
Recall that Assumption 2 ensures for the case dA = dB = 2 that all
consumers buy in the first period. Proposition 3 specifies the first-period
equilibrium prices and the overall profits.
Proposition 3 Consider the case where both firms have chosen dA = dB = 2
in the initial stage. All consumers buy in the first period if (and only if)
Assumption 2 holds. Then, the symmetric first-period equilibrium prices are
given by
p1(2, 2)
∗ = L(1 + δ) + cII
and overall profits are equal to
Π(2, 2)∗ =
L2(1 + δ)
2
.
Proof: see Appendix
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4.3 Asymmetric Case
Finally, consider the case where dA = 1 and dB = 2. Then, a first-period
consumer located at z will buy product A if r−z−pA1 + δ[r−z− (r−σAeL)]
is greater than (1+δ)[r− (L−z)]−pB1 . The marginal consumer is indifferent
between buying product A and B, so that
z =
L(1 + δ)− pA1 + pB1 − δ(r − σAeL)
2(1 + δ)
. (10)
Expectations must be fulfilled, so that σAe = σA = z/L. Then, the market
share is equal to
σAe = σA =
L(1 + δ)− δr − pA1 + pB1
L(2 + δ)
(11)
Firms’ profits are given by
ΠA = (pA1 − cI)σAL+ δ(r − σAL− cI)σAL ,
ΠB = (pB1 − cII)(1− σA)L. (12)
The following Proposition states the first-period equilibrium prices and
overall profits.
Proposition 4 Consider the case where where dA = 1 and dB = 2. Suppose
that Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then, all consumers buy in the first period and
first-period equilibrium prices are given by
pA1 (1, 2)
∗ =
(3L+ 2δL+ cII)(2 + 3δ) + 2cI(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
6 + 5δ
− δr,
pB1 (1, 2)
∗ =
(1 + δ)[(3L+ cI)(2 + δ) + 4cII ]
6 + 5δ
Firm A’s equilibrium market share σA∗ ∈ (0, 1) is equal to
σA(1, 2)∗ =
cII − α
L(6 + 5δ)
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Finally, overall profits are given by
ΠA(1, 2)∗ =
2(1 + δ)(cII − α)2
(6 + 5δ)2
,
ΠB(1, 2)∗ =
(2 + δ)(β − cII)2
(6 + 5δ)2
.
Proof: see Appendix
In Proposition 4, Assumption 1 guarantees that the second-period profits,
as stated in Proposition 1, can be used in the first-period maximization
problem. Assumption 2 ensures for the symmetric case (dA = dB = 2) that
all consumers buy in the first period. We show in the appendix that this
assumption is also sufficient to guarantee for the asymmetric case (di = 1
and dj =i = 2) that the first-period market is covered. Assumption 3 confines
the analysis to interior solutions, i.e. σi∗ ∈ (0, 1). In Section 5, we consider
a numerical example that satisfies Assumptions 1-3.
Unlike in the symmetric cases, equilibrium prices and profits depend on
marginal costs cI and cII . Moreover, p
A
1 (1, 2)
∗ decreases with r. This is
the same effect as in the case of p1(1, 1)
∗ and can be explained analogously:
High reservation prices increase the second-period profits of firm A. This
makes firm A more aggressive in the first-period competition for market
share. However, firm A’s equilibrium profits ΠA(1, 2)∗ do not depend on
r. Thus, as in the first symmetric case, the positive effect on second-period
prices is completely compensated by the negative effect on first-period profits.
Under Assumption 3, equilibrium profits depend on exogenous variables in
the usual way, i.e. the profits of both firms increase with L and δ, firm A’s
profits decrease with cI and increase with cII , and firm B’s profits increase
with cI and decrease with cII .
5 Initial Stage: Durability Choice
In this section, we endogenize the firms’ durability choice and we discuss its
welfare implications.
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5.1 Equilibrium Choice of Durability
We first start with the firms’ equilibrium choice of durability. In the initial
stage, firms simultaneously choose the level of product durability di ∈ {1, 2},
thereby anticipating overall profits Πi∗ that depend on the durability choice
of both firms. The profits are depicted in the following matrix.
dB = 1 dB = 2
dA = 1 L
2(2+δ)
4
, L
2(2+δ)
4
2(1+δ)(cII−α)
2
(6+5δ)2
, (2+δ)(β−cII )
2
(6+5δ)2
dA = 2 (2+δ)(β−cII )
2
(6+5δ)2
, 2(1+δ)(cII−α)
2
(6+5δ)2
L2(1+δ)
2
, L
2(1+δ)
2
Matrix 1: Overall Profits and Durability
It is important to note that Π(2, 2)∗ is always greater than Π(1, 1)∗. Recall
that switching costs give firms monopoly power over their market segments in
the second-period. This effect leads to vigorous competition for market share
in the first period. In our model, the vigorous first-period competition more
than dissipates firms’ extra monopolistic returns of the second period. By
jointly choosing di = 2, firms can overcome this negative competition effect.
However, it depends on the profits in the asymmetric case of whether dA =
dB = 2 constitutes a Nash equilibrium or not. The following Proposition
specifies the equilibrium choice of durability.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. Then, the first-stage
decisions of the firms in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the overall game
are as follows:
(i) If cII > δL/2 + (1 + δ)cI , the durability choice d
A = dB = 1 constitute
the unique equilibrium.
(ii) If cII < δL/2 + (1 + δ)cI , the durability choice d
A = dB = 2 constitute
the unique equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix.
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Consider the case where r = 4 and L = δ = 1. For this example, Figure
2 illustrates the equilibria depending on cI and cII . Assumption 1 restricts
costs to cI < c¯I = r − 2L = 2. As stated in Assumption 2, cII < cˆII =
(1+ δ)(2r− 3L)/2 = 5. In this numerical example, Assumption 3 is satisfied
as long as Assumptions 1 - 2 hold. Recall that cII > cI , as stated in Section
1, so that points below the cII = cI-line should be ignored. In region A, cII
is relatively large compared to cI and d
A = dB = 1 constitutes the unique
equilibrium because cII > δL/2 + (1 + δ)cI = 1/2 + 2cI . On the other hand,
region B + C depicts values of cI and cII where d
A = dB = 2 is the unique
equilibrium.
cII
cˆII
cI
B C
cII = cI
A
c¯I
Figure 2: Equilibrium Choice of Durability
In region A, firms face a prisoners’ dilemma situation: Since Π(2, 2)∗ is
always greater than Π(1, 1)∗, both firms would gain from the cooperative
outcome dA = dB = 2. However, given the cooperative outcome, each firm
would defect because ΠA(1, 2)∗ = ΠB(2, 1)∗ > Π(2, 2)∗. Why would firms
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gain from defection? In region A, marginal costs cII are relatively large
compared to cI . As already shown, costs have no impact on firms’ profits in
the symmetric cases because they can be completely shifted to consumers.8
However, in the asymmetric case, equilibrium profits depend on marginal
costs as shown in Proposition 4. In region A, it is worthwhile to defect (i.e.
to choose di = 1) and thus taking advantage of the large difference in costs.
Analyzing the comparative statics, we find that region A expands com-
pared to region B + C if market size L and discount factor δ decrease. This
implies that the prisoners’ dilemma outcome (dA = dB = 1) would also occur
for relatively low values of cII .
5.2 Socially Efficient Choice of Durability
After having derived the firms’ equilibrium choice of durability, we analyze
the welfare implications. The following Proposition states the socially effi-
cient levels of durability, as chosen by a social planner who maximizes the sum
of overall profits (ΠA + ΠB) and of overall consumer surplus (CSA + CSB)
with respect to dA and dB where CSi denotes the overall surplus of the
product i buyers. In the symmetric cases, prices are nothing but monetary
transfers between consumers and firms that have no impact on social welfare.
Proposition 6 Suppose a social planner maximizes W =
∑
iΠ
i(dA, dB) +∑
iCS
i(dA, dB) with respect to dA and dB.
(i) If cII ≤ (1 + δ)cI , social welfare is maximized by the durability choice
dA = dB = 2.
(ii) If cII ≥ (1 + δ)cI , social welfare is maximized by the durability choice
dA = dB = 1.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 6 shows that the socially efficient durability choice depends
only on differences in costs and on the discount factor. The production of
durable products is efficient if the costs cII are lower than the total costs
of producing non-durable products which are equal to (1 + δ)cI . If firm i
8Recall that Assumptions 1 - 3 ensure that all consumers buy.
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chooses di = 1, it incurs costs cI in each period, where the second-period
costs are discounted. The asymmetric case is always inefficient because total
costs are not minimized and consumers’ transport costs are higher than in
the symmetric cases where σi = 1/2.
Figure 2 illustrates the welfare implications of the firms’ durability choice.
In region A + B, the durability choice dA = dB = 1 is socially efficient
because cII > (1 + δ)cI = 2cI . On the other, d
A = dB = 2 would maximize
social welfare in region C. Comparing the equilibria with the socially efficient
outcomes, we find that firms choose an inefficiently high level of durability in
region B. From a social welfare perspective, firms should choose dA = dB = 1
because cII is relatively large compared to cI . However in region B, firms
can realize the cooperative outcome dA = dB = 2 in equilibrium. It is not
worthwhile to defect as the differences in costs are not large enough from the
firms’ profit perspective. Needless to say that firms do no internalize costs
that they can shift to consumers. In region C, the differences in costs are so
small that a social planner would choose dA = dB = 2 as well.
17
6 Conclusion
In addition to the existing literature on product durability, this paper stud-
ies the impact consumer lock-in may have on firms’ durability choice. We
first show that firms may face a prisoners’ dilemma situation in that they si-
multaneously choose non-durable products although they would have higher
profits by producing durables. As in some classical models with switching
costs, consumer lock-in reduces firms’ overall profits because firms’ extra
monopolistic returns of the second period are more than dissipated by first-
period competition. By the joint choice of durable products, firms could
mitigate the negative competition effect of consumer lock-in. However, if the
marginal costs of producing durables are relatively large compared to the
marginal costs of non-durable products, each firm has the incentive to uni-
laterally deviate to non-durable products. Whenever firms choose the same
level of durability, costs can be completely shifted to consumers as long as
consumers’ reservation price is sufficiently large. However, if firms choose
different levels of durability, overall profits depend on marginal costs. Thus,
each firm could take advantage of the large difference in costs by deviating.
In contrast to the common result of “excessive obsolescence”, we show
that both firms may even choose an inefficiently high level of durability if
differences in marginal costs (with respect to durability) are low. In this
situation, firms jointly choose durable products in equilibrium. Since firms
do not internalize costs that they can shift to consumers, they provide an
excessive level of durability.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case where both firms have chosen
di = 1 in the initial stage. We will show, without loss of generality, that
firm A does not gain from a single deviation from the equilibrium price
pA∗2 = r − σAL. If firm A deviated by choosing a higher price p˜A2 > pA∗2 ,
its second-period sales, z˜A2 = r − p˜A2 , would be lower than its first-period
sales σAL. Thus, firm A would abandon some of its locked-in consumers and
thereby realizing profits
Π˜A2 = (p˜
A
2 − cI)(r − p˜A2 ) (13)
Substitution of p˜A2 = r − σAL+ ǫ into the first derivative of (13) yields
∂Π˜A2
∂pA2
= 2LσA + cI − r − 2ǫ (14)
Expression (14) must be negative for any market share 0 < σA < 1. Substi-
tution of ǫ→ 0 and σA → 1 into (14) yields
∂Π˜A2
∂pA2
= 2L+ cI − r < 0 ⇔ r > 2L+ cI (15)
Thus, firm A will not exceed the equilibrium price because for any price
greater than pA∗2 = r−σAL, profits decrease with prices. On the other hand,
firm i has no incentive to undercut the rival firm because the undercutting
price pˆA2 = r−σiL−s−ǫ is always below marginal costs as long as r < cI+s
holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider the case where firms have chosen dA =
dB = 1 in the initial stage. Substitution of equation (4) into (5) and maxi-
mization with respect to pA1 yields the following first-order condition:
∂ΠA
∂pA1
=
(1 + δ)(L+ cI)− δ(pA1 − pB1 + r)− 2pA1 + pB1
2
= 0 (16)
In the symmetric equilibrium we get
pA∗1 = p
B∗
1 = (L+ cI)(1 + δ)− δr. (17)
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In Proposition 2 we have claimed that Assumption 1 is sufficient to ensure
that all consumers buy in the first period. It remains to be verified if the
first-period market is actually covered. The marginal consumer anticipates
that firm A will completely extract his surplus in the second period, i.e.
r − L/2− pA∗2 = 0. He will buy if (and only if) his first-period surplus is at
least equal to zero:
r − L
2
− pA∗1 ≥ 0 ⇔ r ≥
L
2(1 + δ)
+ L+ cI . (18)
Since 2L + cI > L/[2(1 + δ)] + L + cI , this constraint always holds under
Assumption 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that firms have chosen dA = dB = 2
in the initial stage. Substitution of equation (8) into (9) and maximization
with respect to pA1 yields the following first-order condition:
∂ΠA
∂pA1
=
L(1 + δ) + cII − 2pA1 + pB1
2(1 + δ
= 0 (19)
In the symmetric equilibrium we get
pA∗1 = p
B∗
1 = L(1 + δ) + cII . (20)
As in the previous case, it must be ensured that all consumers buy in the
first period. The marginal consumer buys if (and only if)
(1 + δ)
(
r − L
2
)
− pA∗1 ≥ 0⇔ cII ≤ cˆII =
(1 + δ)(2r − 3L)
2
. (21)
This is equivalent to Assumption 2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose that firms have chosen dA = 1 and dB = 2
in the initial stage. Substitution of equation (11) into (12) and maximization
with respect to pA1 and p
B
1 yields the following first-order conditions:
∂ΠA
∂pA1
=
(1 + δ)[L(2 + 3δ) + cI(2 + δ)]− 4δ2r
(2 + δ)2
+
δ(3pB1 − 4pA1 − 4r)− 2(2pA1 − pB1 )
(2 + δ)2
= 0 (22)
∂ΠB
∂pB1
=
L+ cII + δr + p
A
1 − 2pB1
2 + δ
= 0 (23)
Solving this equation system for pA1 and p
B
1 yields
pA∗1 =
(3L+ 2δL+ cII)(2 + 3δ) + 2cI(1 + δ)(2 + δ)
6 + 5δ
− δr, (24)
pB∗1 =
(1 + δ)[(3L+ cI)(2 + δ) + 4cII ]
6 + 5δ
. (25)
In Proposition 4 we have claimed that all consumers buy in the first period.
We will show that Assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure market coverage for
the asymmetric case. All consumers buy in the first period if (and only if)
r − σA∗L− pA∗1 ≥ 0⇔ cII < c˜II =
r(6 + 5δ)− (3 + 2δ)(3L+ cI)
3
. (26)
Since we consider the marginal consumer at σA∗L, this condition is equivalent
to [r − σB∗L](1 + δ)− pB∗1 ≥ 0. Under Assumption 2, this condition always
holds because c˜II > cˆII :
⇔ 6r + 5δr − 9L− 3cI − 6δL− 2δcI
3
>
2r − 3L+ 2δr − 3δL
2
⇔ (r − cI)(6 + 4δ) > 9L+ 3δL (27)
Assumption 1 is equivalent to r − cI > 2L. Thus the left-hand side of the
expression is greater than 12L + 8δL and thus greater than the right-hand
side. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 5: First, consider the symmetric equilibrium with
dA = dB = 1. Making use of profits Π(1, 1)∗ and ΠB(1, 2)∗, as stated in
Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, we get
Π(1, 1)∗ =
L2(2 + δ)
4
≥ ΠB(1, 2)∗ = (2 + δ)[β − cII ]
2
(6 + 5δ)2
. (28)
This expression can be written as
γ ≥ (β − cII)2, (29)
with β = (3L + cI)(1 + δ) denoting the upper bound of cII , as stated in
Assumption 3, and γ = L2(6 + 5δ)2/4. Solving as equation yields
cII = β +
√
γ ∧ cII = β −√γ. (30)
The first solution is invalid as cII > β would violate Assumption 3. Substi-
tuting back into the correct solution cII = β −√γ gives us
cII = (3L+ cI)(1 + δ)− L(6 + 5δ)
2
=
δL
2
+ cI(1 + δ) (31)
In the equilibrium with dA = dB = 1, marginal costs cII must be greater
than δL/2 + (1 + δ)cI because ∂Π
B(1, 2)∗/∂cII < 0.
It remains to show the uniqueness of the equilibrium with dA = dB = 1.
Making use of profits Π(2, 2)∗ and ΠA(1, 2)∗, as stated in Proposition 3 and
respectively Proposition 4, we get
ΠA(1, 2)∗ =
2(1 + δ)[cII − α]2
(6 + 5δ)2
≥ Π(2, 2)∗ = L
2(1 + δ)
2
(32)
This can be written as
(cII − α)2 ≥ γ, (33)
where α = (1 + δ)cI − L(3 + 2δ) is the lower bound of cII , as given in
Assumption 3, and γ = L2(6 + 5δ)2/4, again. Solving as equation yields
cII = α +
√
γ ∧ cII = α−√γ. (34)
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The second solution is invalid as cII < α would violate Assumption 3. Sub-
stituting back into the correct solution cII = γ +
√
β yields
cII = (1 + δ)cI − L(3 + 2δ) + L(6 + 5δ)
2
=
δL
2
+ cI(1 + δ) (35)
Since ∂ΠA(1, 2)∗/∂cII > 0, marginal costs cII greater than δL/2 + (1 + δ)cI
result in ΠA(1, 2)∗ > Π(2, 2)∗. Hence, dA = dB = 1 is the unique equilibrium
in this case. The symmetric equilibrium with dA = dB = 2 occurs if cII <
δL/2+ (1+ δ)cI because Π(1, 1)
∗ < ΠB(1, 2)∗ and ΠA(1, 2)∗ < Π(2, 2)∗ holds
in this case. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: First, we consider social welfare for the case
dA = dB = 1. Overall consumer surplus for the buyers of product A is given
by
CSA(1, 1) =
∫ L/2
0
[r − z − pA1 (1, 1)∗]dz˜ + δ
∫ L/2
0
[r − z − pA∗2 ]dz˜
=
L[4(1 + δ)(r − cI)− (5 + 3δ)L]
8
. (36)
Due to symmetry, social welfare can be written as
W (1, 1) = 2ΠA(1, 1)
∗ + 2CSA(1, 1)
=
4L(1 + δ)(r − cI)− L2(1 + δ)
4
. (37)
In the case dA = dB = 2, overall consumer surplus is equal to
CSA(2, 2) =
∫ L/2
0
[r − z − pA1 (2, 2)∗]dz˜ + δ
∫ L/2
0
[r − z]dz˜
=
4(1 + δ)rL− 4cIIL− (1 + δ)5L2
8
. (38)
Social welfare is given by
W (2, 2) = 2ΠA(2, 2)
∗ + 2CSA(2, 2)
=
4(1 + δ)rL− 4cIIL− (1 + δ)L2
4
. (39)
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Finally, comparing W (1, 1) with W (2, 2), we get
W (1, 1) > W (2, 2) ⇔ cII > cI(1 + δ). (40)
Q.E.D.
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